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Abstract
This paper explores the rationale for unemployment bene￿ts as
a complement to optimal non-linear income taxation. High-skilled
workers and low-skilled workers face diﬀerent exogenous risks of being
unemployed. As long as the low-skilled workers face a higher unem-
ployment risk, we ￿nd that there is a case for over-insuring the low-
skilled, hence the unemployment bene￿ts of the low-skilled should be
higher than the pure insurance purpose would prescribe. This eﬀect
is likely to prevail in a model with a more realistic treatment of the
labor market.
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11 Introduction
The primary purpose of unemployment bene￿ts is the insurance aspect; risk
averse individuals need to be insured against the wage loss during unemploy-
ment. There is however a cost of this insurance since it may result in adverse
eﬀects on the unemployed workers￿ search behavior; see Mortensen (1977).
The seminal paper by Shavell and Weiss (1979) argues that this adverse be-
havioral eﬀect may be reduced if the unemployment bene￿t is a decreasing
function of the elapsed unemployment duration. This result is con￿rmed by
a more recent study by Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001), who address the
issue in a search unemployment framework (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000).
In the present study we will approach the unemployment insurance issue
from a diﬀerent angle. The model will be based on the Stiglitz (1982) model
of optimal non-linear income taxation. We will introduce unemployment in
the most simple fashion; high-skilled workers and low-skilled workers will
face diﬀerent exogenous risks of becoming unemployed. This means that
we abstract from the adverse behavioral eﬀects that the insurance system
may have. Full insurance will thus be possible without any eﬃciency losses
stemming from e.g. reduced job search.
The Stiglitz (1982) model of optimal income taxation has been applied
to a large number of issues. Extensions have been made in many directions,
ranging from heterogeneous preferences for leisure (Boadway et al, 2001)
to the inclusion of commodity taxation (Edwards et al, 1994). However,
papers that introduce unemployment into the model are very hard to come by.
Two exceptions are Engstr￿m (2002) and Aronsson and Sj￿gren (2001). But
Engstr￿m (2002) ignores unemployment bene￿ts and Aronsson and Sj￿gren
(2001) view the unemployed workers as a third type of workers, hence the
unemployment bene￿ts do not serve as an insurance tool.
We will highlight a new reason for having unemployment bene￿ts for low-
skilled workers. We ￿nd that in an optimal taxation setting, bene￿ts may
be an attractive way to transfer resources from the high-skilled to the low-
skilled provided that the low-skill unemployment rate is at least as high as
the high-skill rate.
2A case for over-insurance of low-skilled workers arises when the so called
self selection constraint (SSC) binds. The SSC ensures that the high-skilled
workers prefer the consumption bundle that the government intends for them
rather than the consumption bundle intended for the low-skilled workers.
This constraint is due to the government￿s lack of information about each
worker￿s skill type. If the high-skilled workers earn the same income as the
low-skilled workers, the government cannot levy diﬀerent tax rates, nor dif-
ferent unemployment bene￿ts since the bene￿t level is based on the income.
In the optimal taxation literature this is called ￿mimicking￿; the high-skilled
workers may mimic the low-skilled workers in order to avoid high taxes. The
attractiveness of mimicking generally increases with the level of resources
redistributed from high-skilled workers to low-skilled workers. But if unem-
ployment is mostly a low-skilled phenomenon, increased low-skilled bene￿ts
will not increase the attractiveness of mimicking to a large extent. The reason
for this is that the mimickers do not bene￿t from the low-skill unemployment
bene￿ts to the same extent as the low-skilled workers do.
The rationale for over-insuring the low-skilled workers can also be illus-
trated through the ￿economics of tagging￿ (see the seminal paper by Akerlof,
1978). If it is mostly the unskilled that are unemployed, the government can
use the unemployment as a tagging device; being observed as an unemployed
indicates that you probably belong to the ￿needy group￿.
The paper is outlined as follows. In section 2 the model is presented. We
present the workers￿ optimization problems and the government￿s objectives
and information set. In section 3 we derive analytical results for the optimal
marginal tax rates as well as the optimal bene￿t levels. We proceed by
discussing the intuition behind the results. Section 4 concludes.
32T h e M o d e l
2.1 The Workers
There are two types of workers in the economy: high-skilled (H)a n dl o w -
skilled (L). We consider a very simple ￿semi-dynamic￿1 model with homoge-
nous workers within each skill group. The workers are in￿nitely lived and
forward looking. For simplicity we let the number of high-skilled workers
equal the number of low-skilled workers, and we normalize this number to
unity. The workers are either employed or unemployed. The rate at which
unemployed workers of type j become employed is denoted αj and the rate
at which employed workers of type j lose their job is denoted φj, j = H,L.
Both αj and φj are exogenous. The workers derive utility from consumption
(C) and disutility from work (L). The instantaneous utility of a worker of
ability j is given by:
υj = υ(Cj,L j) if employed, and (1)
υuj = υ(Bj,0) if unemployed. (2)
where Bj is the unemployment bene￿t intended for the unemployed workers
of ability j. The instantaneous utility function υ(.) is assumed to be equal
across diﬀerent types of workers. We impose the standard assumptions that
υCC < 0,υLL < 0. Furthermore we assume that consumption and leisure are
weak complements, hence
υCL ≤ 0. (3)
Let Ej represent the total state value of being employed and Uj the state
value of being unemployed. Ej and Uj are then determined by the following
value functions:
rEj = υj + φj(Uj − Ej), (4)
rUj = υuj + αj (Ej − Uj), (5)
1The exact meaning of the term ￿semi-dynamic￿ will be revealed below.
4where r is the time preference shared by all workers in the economy. We make











In steady state the j−type unemployment rate is given by uj =
φj
αj+φj and





r→0rUj =( 1− uj)υj + ujυuj, (7)
w h e r ew eh a v ed e ￿ned υe
j as today￿s fraction of the total state value.2 When
there is no discounting (r approaches to zero), today￿s fraction of the to-
tal state value will simply be the state independent expected instantaneous
utility for a representative worker.3 υe
j is thus independent of the current
state (employed or unemployed). The government is only concerned with
υe
H and υe
L,w h i c hs i m p l i ￿es the optimal taxation analysis substantially since
the government does not need to consider all 4 types/states of workers in
the economy; all that matter to the government are the workers￿ types, not
each worker￿s current state.4 These simplifying assumptions ￿ steady state
analysis and ignoring discounting ￿ give very convenient static ￿avors to the
model; hence the term ￿semi-dynamic￿.
Market wages (w)a r ee x o g e n o u sw i t hwH >w L. In the employed state
the workers maximize υ(Cj,L j) w.r.t. Cj and Lj, recognizing their budget
restrictions and the tax function T(wjLj). This maximization problem can
thus be expressed as:
max
Lj
υ(wjLj − T(wjLj),L j).( 8 )
2Since the unemployment rate is fully determined by the exogenous ￿ow rates, we will
treat the unemployment rates as exogenous in the subsequent analysis. αj and φj will not
matter apart from the equilibrium unemployment rate they imply.
3Note that a static one shot model, with uj being the risk of unemployment, would
generate the same expression (7) for the expected utility.
4In the subsequent analysis we will use the term ￿expected utility￿ instead of the longer
term ￿today￿s fraction of the total state value￿.










+1 .( 9 )
It turns out that it is more convenient for the subsequent analysis to








+1 .( 1 0 )
2.2 The Government
The government￿s only objective is redistribution; all the tax that is col-
lected is redistributed back as transfers. The set of policy instruments at
the government￿s disposal is {T(Y ),B H,B L},w h e r eBj is the unemployment
bene￿t intended for workers with ability j. The government seeks to ￿nd
the set of Pareto optimal solutions to the tax problem. Technically this is
done by maximizing the expected utility of a representative individual of one
ability, under the restriction of a minimum utility constraint (υe
j = υe
j)o n
the representative individual of the other ability.
As in the basic Stiglitz (1982) model we assume that the government
has imperfect information concerning each worker￿s ability. This means that
the government can only tax income; each worker￿s ability is not revealed
to the government. If the government would try to tax the high-skilled at a
very high rate and transfer a lot to the low-skilled, the high-skilled workers
may mimic the low-skilled workers. This imperfect information also holds
in the unemployment state; the government can only base the level of the
bene￿ts to an unemployed worker of type j on the income he had when
he was employed. The decision to mimic therefore also aﬀects the future
bene￿t level when being unemployed. In this model as in the basic Stiglitz
(1982) model, the imperfect information leads to a self selection constraint
(SSC) facing the government when ￿nding the Pareto optimal path. The
SSC ensures that the high-skilled workers do not have incentives to pretend


















Apart from the minimum utility constraint and the SSC, the government
also needs to balance the budget. The budget constraint is:
(1 − uH)YH+(1 − uL)YL =( 1− uH)CH+(1 − uL)CL+uHBH+uLBL. (12)
The optimal taxation problem can now be stated formally. We follow the
usual practice (see e.g. Stiglitz, 1987) and substitute out the unobservable
Lj =
Yj























(1 − uH)YH +( 1− uL)YL =( 1 − uH)CH +( 1− uL)CL + uHBH + uLBL.


















(1 − uH)YH +( 1− uL)YL
−(1 − uH)CH − (1 − uL)CL − uHBH − uLBL
#
,
5In principle the low-skilled workers could have incentives to mimic the high-skilled
workers, but we assume that the government wants to distribute from high-skilled to
low-skilled and then this possibility never arises.
7where υe
m is the mimicker￿s utility; hence υe
m =( 1− uH)υ(CL,
YL
wH)+uHυ(BL,0).
￿, λH and γ are Lagrange multipliers for which hold:
￿>0,
λH ≥ 0 and
γ > 0.


















− γuH =0 (17)
∂Ψ
∂CL
= ￿(1 − uL)
∂υL
∂CL
− λH(1 − uH)
∂υm
∂CL
− γ (1 − uL)=0 (18)
∂Ψ
∂YL
= ￿(1 − uL)
∂υL
∂YL
− λH(1 − uH)
∂υm
∂YL









− γuL =0 , (20)
where υm = υ(CL,
YL
wH).
3 The Pareto Optimal Regimes
3.1 Optimal Marginal Tax Rates
We start by deriving the expressions for the optimal marginal tax rates. For
this we need lemma 1 which gives the usual property that the indiﬀerence





dYj |υj=υj > 0,h e n c et h ei n d i ﬀerence curves are convex in C
and Y space.
8Proof See Appendix.
We can now show (proposition 1 below) that the results for the optimal
marginal tax rates from Stiglitz (1982) are not changed when introducing
exogenous unemployment. When the SSC does not bind we have a ￿rst best
solution with zero marginal tax on both high and low-skilled workers. When
the SSC binds we need a positive marginal tax on the low-skilled workers in
order to reduce the attractiveness of mimicking.













H =0 . (21)
T0
H ≥ 0:










































L =0 for λH =0and (24)
T
0
L > 0 for λH > 0.
93.2 Optimal Beneﬁts
We now turn to the main objective of the paper: the optimal unemployment
bene￿ts. Proposition 2 shows that the high-skilled workers should be fully
insured against unemployment and that there may be reasons to over-insure
the low-skilled workers.








ii) When λH > 0 the following hold for the low-skill unemployment bene￿ts:





































































which completes the proof.
The ￿rst part of the result says that the high-skilled workers should be
fully insured against unemployment; the marginal utility of consumption is
equalized between the two states. With the assumptions we made about the
10utility function this means that BH ≥ CH, hence workers consume at least
as much when unemployed as they do when employed. It is obvious that
this result would not hold in a model featuring a more realistic treatment
of the origins of unemployment. However, the focus of this paper is not to
give a rigorous treatment of the unemployment bene￿t issue but rather to
emphasize one important mechanism concerning the unemployment bene￿ts
of the low-skilled workers in an optimal taxation model.
The second result means that when the unemployment rate for the low-
skilled is at least as high as the unemployment rate for the high-skilled and
the SSC binds (λH > 0), there is a case for over-insurance against unem-
ployment; the low-skilled workers￿ marginal utility of consumption should be
lower in the unemployment state than in the employment state. The con-
sumption in the unemployment state for the low-skilled is then higher than
it would be if the government only used BH as an insurance tool. This is the
main result of this paper and we will spend some eﬀort trying to pin down
what drives it.
The result arises when the SSC is binding; when λH is zero the bene￿ts
to the low-skilled are only used for insurance purposes. When trying to
understand results intuitively it is often instructive to consider the extreme
special cases. We therefore start by considering the case when unemployment
is a pure low-skilled phenomenon. Think of the case when uH =0and the














and BL is obviously larger than the insurance purpose would prescribe. The
government wants to distribute resources to the low-skilled, without inducing
the high-skilled to mimic the low-skilled. When uH =0this can easily be
achieved by increasing BL, since the high-skilled cannot take advantage of the
increased bene￿ts, due to their lack of unemployment spells. Increased low-
skilled bene￿ts therefore only increase the utility of the low-skilled. There
is of course a cost associated with this redistribution, stemming from an
eﬃciency loss caused by over-insurance of the low-skilled. But this example
11explains why the bene￿ts to the low-skilled should be higher than the eﬃcient
insurance level when unemployment is mostly a low-skilled phenomenon. On
the margin, the government needs to balance two diﬀerent eﬃciency losses:
the loss from over-insurance of the low-skilled and the loss from increasing
the marginal tax on the low-skilled. In the model without unemployment
(see e.g. Stiglitz, 1982), the only way the government could distribute more
to the low-skilled was by increasing the marginal tax facing the low-skilled,
and thereby making mimicking less attractive.6
The above example does not explain why there still may be over-insurance
of the low-skilled when uH = uL and λH > 0. In this case the mimicker will be
unemployed to the same extent as a low skilled worker and thus bene￿tf r o m
the high level of unemployment insurance. However, we need to compare
this to the alternative. The government has two choices ￿ provided that
it must increase the utility of the low-skilled workers ￿ of how to transfer
resources. The government could either increase the low-skilled workers￿
unemployment bene￿ts, or it could increase the in-work transfers to the low-
skilled. In the former case the mimickers and the low-skilled workers bene￿t
to the exactly same extent, since the unemployment rates are the same and
the instantaneous utilities in the unemployment state are the same. But
in the latter case the mimicker will bene￿t more if the marginal utility of
consumption is decreasing in labor input (hence in the case when (3) holds
with strict inequality), and the mimicker ￿ due to his high wage ￿ puts in less
labor than the low-skilled. The government will therefore choose the least
bad thing of two bad things and increase the unemployment bene￿ts for the
low-skilled until the eﬃciency loss from over insurance gets too high.
4 Conclusions
The paper has exposed a new reason for having high unemployment bene￿ts
for low-skilled workers. We found that in an optimal taxation setting, bene￿ts
6See Engstr￿m (2002) for an intuitive explanation of why increased distribution to the
low-skilled needs to be accompanied by an increase in the low-skill marginal tax.
12may be a preferable way to transfer resources from the high-skilled to the
low-skilled provided that the low-skill unemployment rate is at least as high
as the high-skill rate. The reason for this is that the mimickers do not bene￿t
from the unemployment bene￿ts intended for the low-skilled workers to the
same extent as the low-skilled workers do. If the mimickers do not face
unemployment spells, they will not bene￿t from this transfer at all, which
makes the unemployment bene￿t an attractive tool for redistribution.
In future work it would be interesting to introduce a more realistic treat-
ment of the labor market into this model. Since the unemployment bene￿ts
have adverse eﬀects on job search, the optimal unemployment bene￿t levels
would be lower with a more serious treatment of the labor market. But the
main mechanism described in this paper would prevail as long as unemploy-
ment is mostly a low-skilled phenomenon.
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Taking the derivative of
dCj
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which completes the proof.
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